Summary
The pandemic did not create the UK’s constitutional crisis, rather it exacerbated a pre-existing condition. The UK Government should renew devolution through redrawing the institutions of intergovernmental relations to establish a ‘Council of Ministers and Mayors.’
Reform would reduce conflict between UK and devolved leaders; promote policy innovation; and strengthen public trust through demonstrating the purpose of the UK union. This would help address the dual challenges of government efficacy and public legitimacy – creating conditions for a faster and fairer recovery.
1. Case for reform
The hidden constitutional plumbing supporting devolution is largely unchanged in three decades. Reform is timely with more powers being exercised in Scotland and Wales, and English devolution through Mayors. Relationships and responsibilities will grow more complex post-Brexit, not least with Northern Ireland remaining in the EU single market for goods.
The pandemic witnessed the UK’s constitutional crisis reaching England as Mayors were pitched against the centre. As Michael Gove acknowledged, this raises “a broader question, not about power grabs and clawbacks but making sure the whole devolution settlement works.”
All leaders face challenges for which the solutions increasingly overlap between powers devolved and reserved. Governments increasingly depend on each other to be effective. But the only institution bringing cohesion to asymmetric devolution is not equipped for the task. The Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), established with devolution in 1999, is no longer fit for purpose.
2. A Council of Ministers and Mayors
Creating a ‘Council of Ministers and Mayors’ (the Council) would signal a statement of intent to renew devolution. It should replace the JMC with a higher profile and shared forum, not dominated by Central Government. The Council should convene leaders with a direct mandate: the Prime Minister, devolved First Ministers, and elected English Mayors. It may adopt a two-tier structure reflecting First Ministers wider responsibilities. Relevant UK and devolved Minsters, and regional representatives, may attend when required.
To reduce reliance on the political colour and commitment of the governments of the day, reform should address remit, regularity, and resourcing.
2.1 Wider remit
The JMC focuses too narrowly on resolving disputes. It is confined to: “non-devolved matters which impinge on devolved responsibilities, and devolved matters which impinge on non-devolved responsibilities;” and with agreement “devolved matters in the different parts of the UK.”
The new Council’s wider remit should promote shared understanding of reserved policy and respective priorities. UK budgets have long impacted devolved funding. Reserved decisions on universal credit impact devolved areas such as social housing. And as more powers are devolved a new dimension is the interplay between UK policy and new devolved institutions. For example, Scotland holds powers to top-up UK social security or create new benefits.
An expanded remit to include all relevant reserved matters would facilitate a stronger voice for devolved leaders. The Council should enable discussion and deviation on reserved matters, with agreement. Scotland’s 2005 ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative offers a template, whereby different rules on the reserved matter of postgraduate immigration were applied for overseas students.
2.2 Regular meetings
Whereas the JMC is ad hoc, the Council should convene regularly. This would create higher profile moments in the political calendar. There is logic to meeting twice annually: first in London following the State Opening of Parliament which details UK Government legislative priorities, typically in May/June. The second meeting could be hosted on rotation by the devolved administrations – before November’s Autumn Statement or Spending Review, which typically determines the devolved block grant. This would promote shared understanding of UK Government policies and priorities while they are being framed.
The twice-yearly meetings would create an opportunity for public engagement. School exchanges to witness the Council in action would promote understanding of how government works and create shared experiences among children from different regions and backgrounds.
2.3 Better resourced
The Council should be resourced to facilitate policy learning, experimentation and incorporate outside expertise. The purpose is to deliver better policy through embracing innovation at a devolved level, with lessons widely shared:
-Experimentation: devolved policy innovation, enabled by the centre. The Council should facilitate access to UK Government policy expertise which would help address any devolved capacity challenges. Scotland and Wales already had a well-established civil service in 1999, unlike England’s Mayors. Enhancing access to analytical and evaluative capacity would improve policymaking.
-Learning: few policy transfer mechanisms exist between devolved institutions and the centre, meaning good ideas fail to be recognised or replicated. Successes like the Scottish smoking ban or Welsh organ opt-out should become commonplace.
-Expertise: engaging civil society was a founding ideal of devolution. The Council could introduce this aspiration to interactions among leaders. One approach would be offering observer status to business representatives and trade unions, including from the devolved nations and regions.
Through the Council, devolved leaders gain a stronger voice and increased capacity to act, with greater accountability as barriers to delivery are removed.
3. Promote unions purpose
The Council’s structures should illustrate the purpose of the UK’s political, economic and social union. This should underpin the Council’s remit and operations, namely providing:
-Security: UK wide minimum on wages, pensions and social security. Aspects of which can be supplemented or topped-up through devolved powers. As seen through the pandemic, the UK Treasury can borrow at lower cost and bear greater risk during economic shocks.
-Solidarity: UK fiscal transfers face no upper limit or strings attached for devolved government spending; with the Barnett formula protecting against political interference. In practice redistribution flows from London and the South-East to other nations and regions.
-Subsidiarity: empowering local decision making and policy experimentation.
Conclusion
As devolution enters its third decade, reforming intergovernmental institutions can help deliver its original promise of more representative and effective government. A new ‘Council of Ministers and Mayors’ – with enhanced remit, resource and visibility – would renew devolution.
This is an enabler or even prerequisite for implementing new policy ideas, levelling up across the UK, and building back better. Reform would strengthen the case for devolution over independence, ensuring these institutions survive the next decade.
1822-11